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Bad News for Mail Robbers:
The Obvious Constitutionality of Health Care Reform

Andrew Koppelman*

The Supreme Court may be teeing up for its most dramatic
intervention in American politics, and most flagrant abuse of
its power, since Bush v. Gore.

Challenges to President Obama’s

health care bill have started to work their way toward the
Court, and have been sustained by two Republican-appointed
district judges.
The constitutional objections are silly.

But because

constitutional law is abstract and technical, and almost no one
reads Supreme Court opinions, the conservative majority on the
Court may feel emboldened to adopt these silly objections in
order to crush the most important progressive legislation in
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comments. A version of this paper was presented at the American Health
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decades.

One lesson of Bush v. Gore, which, surveys showed, did

no harm at all to the Court’s prestige in the eyes of the
public,1 is that if there are any limits to the judges’s power,
those limits are political:

absent a likelihood of public

outrage, they can do anything they want.

So the fate of health

care reform may depend on the constitutional issues being at
least well enough understood for shame to have some effect on
the Court.
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010
includes a so-called “individual mandate,” actually a tax that
must be paid by individuals who go without health insurance.2
This mandate is the focus of challenges to the law.

Without the

mandate, the law’s protection of people with preexisting
conditions would mean that healthy people could wait until they
get sick to buy insurance.

That would bankrupt the entire

health insurance system, because no one would be paying into the
pools.

Congress decided to charge those people for the costs

they impose on their fellow citizens.
Two federal district judges have declared this provision
unconstitutional.

Their reasoning is bizarre and mischievous.

The novel approach to constitutional law that they propose would
1

See Herbert M. Kritzer, The Impact of Bush v. Gore on Public Perceptions and
Knowledge of the Supreme Court, 85 Judicature 32 (2001).
2
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, 124 Stat.
119 (2010), amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act, Pub. L.
No. 111–152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010). The individual mandate is § 1501(b) (to
be codified at 26 U.S.C § 5000A).
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misread the Constitution, betray the intentions of the framers,
and cripple the nation’s ability to address one of its most
pressing problems.
The correct legal analysis is simple.

Congress has the

authority to solve problems that the states cannot separately
solve.

It can choose any reasonable means to do that.

I. The obvious constitutionality

The “mandate” is clearly within Congress’s power under
Article I, section 8 of the Constitution to “regulate Commerce .
. . among the several states.”

Under settled present law, some

of it nearly 200 years old, Congress may regulate activity that
has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.

It may

regulate local, noneconomic behavior, the Supreme Court recently
held, when such regulation is “an essential part of a larger
regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme
could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were
regulated.”3

It thus as recently as 2005 upheld a federal ban on

growing marijuana for personal consumption.
The problem of insuring those with preexisting conditions
could be addressed with a single-payer insurance system, of the
kind that exists in Canada, France, and England:

everyone gets

3

Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 23-24 (2005)(quoting United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995).

3

insurance provided by the government, funded by general
taxation.

The American government already forces you to buy

single-payer insurance against poverty in your old age.
Social Security.

That’s

A similar single-payer system of medical care

makes a great deal of sense, but so many powerful interests were
arrayed against it that it was never going to pass.

Political

obstacles aside, Congress is entitled to decide that a
government monopoly of health provision would be inefficient,
and that insurance is best provided by the private sector.

In

that case, the only way to guarantee health insurance for
everyone is to require the healthy to purchase private
insurance.

The remedy tightly fits the problem.

The power to regulate insurance markets is part of the
commerce power.

The Supreme Court declared in 1944:

“Perhaps

no modern commercial enterprise directly affects so many persons
in all walks of life as does the insurance business. Insurance
touches the home, the family, and the occupation or the business
of almost every person in the United States.”4
Congress has the discretion to decide the best way to
accomplish that.

The list of Congressional powers in Article I

ends with an authorization to “make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper” to carry out its responsibilities.

The

interpretation of this provision, which makes the health care
4

United States v. Southeastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 540 (1944).
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question an easy one, was settled in 1819 by Chief Justice John
Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland.5
The central question in McCulloch was whether Congress had
the power to charter the Bank of the United States, the
precursor of today’s Federal Reserve.

The Constitution does not

enumerate any power to create corporations.

The Bank’s

opponents argued that the “necessary and proper” language
permitted Congress only to choose means which were absolutely
necessary to carry out those powers.

Marshall rejected this

reading, which would make the government “incompetent to its
great objects.”6

The federal government must collect and spend

revenue throughout the United States, Marshall observed, and so
must quickly transfer funds across hundreds of miles.

“Is that

construction of the constitution to be preferred which would
render these operations hazardous, difficult, and expensive?”7
Without implied powers, Congress’s power “to establish post
offices” could not entail the ability to punish those who rob
the mail, and might not even entail the power to carry letters
from one post office to another.

“It may be said with some

plausibility that the right to carry the mail, and to punish

5
6
7

17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
Id.
Id. at 408.

5

those who rob it, is not indispensably necessary to the
establishment of a post office and post road.”8
The basic rule of McCulloch was reaffirmed by the Court as
recently as May, 2010.

In deciding whether Congress is

appropriately exercising its powers under the necessary and
proper clause, the question is “whether the statute constitutes
a means that is rationally related to the implementation of a
constitutionally enumerated power.”9

The choice of means is left

“’primarily . . . to the judgment of Congress. If it can be seen
that the means adopted are really calculated to attain the end,
the extent to which they conduce to the end, the closeness of
the relationship between the means adopted and the end to be
attained, are matters for congressional determination alone.’”10
Thus, for example, even though the Constitution mentions no
federal crimes other than counterfeiting, treason, and piracy,
Congress has broad authority to enact criminal statutes.11

II. The purported constitutional limitations

A. The commerce power

8

Id. at 417.
United States v. Comstock, 130 S.Ct. 1949, 1956 (2010).
10
Id. at 1957, quoting Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 547-48
(1934).
11
Id.
9
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Opponents of the mandate claim that, even if Congress can
regulate health care, it can’t demand that you purchase private
insurance.

“Congress has never before mandated that a citizen

enter into an economic transaction with a private company,”
writes Prof. Randy Barnett, “so there can be no judicial
precedent for such a law.”12

But when Congress chartered the

Bank of the United States, it had never done that before,
either.

The underlying principle is not novel at all.

The

Court declared it in McCulloch: a government which has the right
to do an act – here, to regulate health care – “must, according
to the dictates of reason, be allowed to select the means.”13
The principal complaint about the mandate is that it is not
a regulation of any activity.

Two prominent critics, David

Rivkin and Lee Casey, object that it will “apply to every
American simply because they exist.”14

But for reasons already

explained, unless free riders are brought into the system, there
is no way to insure everyone else.

The Eastern Virginia judge,

Henry Hudson, declared that in order to be subject to regulation
by Congress, an individual had to engage in “some type of self-

12

Randy Barnett, Exceeding Congress’s Authority, New York Times Room For
Debate, Mar. 28, 2010, http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/03/28/isthe-health-care-law-unconstitutional/.
13
McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 409-10.
14
David B. Rivkin, Jr. & Lee A. Casey, Health Care Purchase Mandate:
Unconstitutional and Likely to Be Struck Down by the Courts, in A Healthy
Debate at 99.
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initiated action.”15

Roger Vinson, the Florida judge, similarly

argued that failure to purchase health insurance is
“inactivity,” and Congress cannot regulate inactivity.
Vinson acknowledges that there is no authority for this
distinction, but quotes United States v. Lopez16 for the
proposition that unless the commerce power is somehow limited,
it would be “difficult to perceive any limitation on federal
power.”17

If Congress can regulate inactivity, Vinson declared,

it “could do almost anything it wanted,” and “we would have a
Constitution in name only.”18
citing Lopez:

But there’s a big problem with

it imposed limits on federal power, and the law

it struck down (a ban on possessing handguns near schools) did
not regulate inactivity.

Lopez itself shows that Congressional

power can be limited without the activity/inactivity
distinction.

The authority on which Vinson relies completely

undermines the point he is trying to make.
It is an interesting semantic question whether the decision
to free ride on the health care system without paying for
insurance is economic activity.

It is obviously an economic

decision with economic consequences, but it still may not be
economic activity, and a great deal of ink has been spilled on
15

Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F.Supp.2d 768, 782 (E.D. Va.
2010).
16
514 U.S. 549 (1995).
17
Fla. v. Dep’t of Health and Human Svcs., 2011 WL 285683 (N.D. Fla. 2011) at
*42.
18
Id.
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that question.19

It doesn’t matter.

Under the necessary and

proper clause, it is enough that there is a national problem
that only Congress can solve, and that “the means chosen are
reasonably adapted to the attainment of a legitimate end.”20

B.

The necessary and proper clause

The deepest flaw in the analyses by Judges Hudson and
Vinson is their complete failure to grasp the fundamental
McCulloch principle.

(I teach an introductory Constitutional

Law class at Northwestern Law School.
first week.)

We read McCulloch in the

Both supposed, nonsensically, that the commerce

power is somehow a limit on Congress’s power to choose
appropriate means.21

(Two other district judges, in Michigan and

the Western District of Virginia, were more sensible, and
summarily threw out the challenges.22)

19

See, e.g., David Kopel, The Obamacare mandate is unconstitutional, Daily
Caller, Oct. 8, 2010, http://dailycaller.com/2010/10/08/the-obamacaremandate-is-unconstitutional/; Ilya Somin, Michigan District Court Upholds
Individual Mandate Against Challenge by the Thomas More Law Center, Volokh
Conspiracy, Oct. 7, 2010, http://volokh.com/2010/10/07/michigan-districtcourt-upholds-individual-mandate-against-challenge-by-the-thomas-more-lawcenter/.
20
United States v. Comstock, 130 S.Ct. 1949, 1957 (2010).
21
Fla. v. Dep’t of Health and Human Svcs., 716 F.Supp.2d 1120 (N.D. Fla.
2010)(refusing to dismiss challenge); Fla. v. Dep’t of Health and Human
Svcs., 2011 WL 285683 (N.D. Fla. 2011)(invalidating law); Virginia ex rel.
Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 702 F.Supp.2d 598 (E.D. Va. 2010)(refusing to dismiss
challenge); Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F.Supp.2d 768 (E.D.
Va. 2010)(invalidating law).
22
Thomas More Center v. Obama, 720 F.Supp.2d 882 (E.D. Mich. 2010); Liberty
Univ. v. Geithner, 2010 WL 4860299 (W.D. Va. 2010).
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“If a person’s decision not to purchase health insurance at
a particular time does not constitute the type of economic
activity subject to regulation under the Commerce Clause,” Judge
Hudson declared, “then logically, an attempt to enforce such
provision under the Necessary and Proper Clause is equally
offensive to the Constitution.”23

By the same “logic,” if I

can’t pick up a pencil with my brain, then it follows that I
can’t do it with my hand either.
other constitutional contexts.

Try this reasoning in a few

If locking up mail robbers is no

part of the operation of a post office, then an attempt to do
that under the Necessary and Proper Clause is equally offensive
to the Constitution.

If growing marijuana for one’s own

consumption is not regulable economic activity, then it too is
immune from federal law.
Judge Vinson’s analysis was even wilder.

He acknowledges,

and even quotes, Chief Justice Marshall’s declaration in
McCulloch that if “the end be legitimate,” then “all means which
are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end . . . are
constitutional.”24

And then he admits that, under the settled

meaning of the commerce power, which he does not question,25

23

The sentence appears in both Cuccinelli opinions: 728 F.Supp.2d at 779, 702
F.Supp.2d at 611.
24
Fla. v. Dep’t of Health and Human Svcs., 2011 WL at *61, quoting McCulloch
at 421.
25
He does suggest, as “an historical aside,” that insurance contracts are not
part of commerce under what he takes to be the original understanding, but he
does not pursue the point. Id. at *23.
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“regulating the health care insurance industry (including
preventing insurers from excluding or charging higher rates to
people with pre-existing conditions)” is a legitimate end.26
But, three sentences later, he declares:

“The Necessary and

Proper Clause cannot be utilized to ‘pass laws for the
accomplishment of objects’ that are not within Congress’s
enumerated powers.”27

Has he so quickly forgotten that he

admitted that the object was within Congress’s enumerated
powers?
Judge Vinson notes that the government has “asserted again
and again that the individual mandate is absolutely ‘necessary’
and ‘essential’ for the Act to operate as it was intended by
Congress.

I accept that it is.”28

(Because the mandate was so

necessary to the entire legislative scheme, he declared it
nonseverable and invalidated the entire law.) In other words,
even if McCulloch had come out the other way, the mandate would
be authorized by the necessary and proper clause.

But the

mandate is nonetheless unconstitutional, because it “falls
outside the boundary of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority and
cannot be reconciled with a limited government of enumerated

26
27
28

Id. at *61-*62.
Id. at *62.
Id. at *63.
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powers.”29

But this is flatly inconsistent with the authority

that he just quoted.
He suggests a more definite limitation on Congressional
power:

the necessary and proper clause cannot be invoked if the

problem Congress is trying to address is Congress’s own fault.
Here is the argument:
[R]ather than being used to implement or facilitate
enforcement of the Act's insurance industry reforms, the
individual mandate is actually being used as the means to
avoid the adverse consequences of the Act itself. Such an
application of the Necessary and Proper Clause would have
the perverse effect of enabling Congress to pass illconceived, or economically disruptive statutes, secure in
the knowledge that the more dysfunctional the results of
the statute are, the more essential or ‘necessary’ the
statutory fix would be. Under such a rationale, the more
harm the statute does, the more power Congress could assume
for itself under the Necessary and Proper Clause. This
result would, of course, expand the Necessary and Proper
Clause far beyond its original meaning.30
If, however, Congress has no power to address negative
consequences that follow from its own statutory scheme, then
Marshall was wrong about mail robbery after all.
29
30

Mail robbery

Id.
Id. at *60.
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is an adverse consequence of Congress’s decision to establish a
post office: had it not done that, all those valuable papers
would not be gathered together in one place.

But, you’ll say,

that’s crazy; of course Congress can decide that it’s worth
having a post office, even if establishing one creates negative
side-effects which then must be addressed.

But if, as Vinson

admitted, Congress can also decide that people with preexisting
conditions can be protected, then how can the cases be
distinguished?

C.

The taxing power

Even if you somehow suppose that the mandate exceeds the
commerce power, it would be valid anyway as an exercise of the
power to tax.

Congress has a general power to “collect Taxes”

to provide for the “general Welfare of the United States.”

The

taxing power is not limited to objects of interstate commerce.
A tax, the Court held in 1950, does not become unconstitutional
“because it touches on activities which Congress might not
otherwise regulate.”31

A claim that the tax is a “direct tax”

forbidden by Article I, section 9 is even wilder, since the
mandate is neither a general tax on individuals nor a tax on

31

United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 44 (1950).
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real estate – the original targets of this obscure and now
rarely invoked provision.32
Judges Hudson and Vinson declared that the mandate is not a
tax because some of the law’s sponsors sometimes claimed that it
was not, and because the statute declared that it was based on
the commerce power.

(It did not, however, expressly disclaim

reliance on the taxing power.)33
remarkable new doctrines:

This reasoning would create two

that federal courts have authority to

police the public statements of politicians, and that Congress
must expressly invoke all possible constitutional bases for
legislation.34

It is, however, long settled doctrine that

federal statutes are presumed to be constitutional, and that, as
the Supreme Court said in 1948, “The question of the
constitutionality of action taken by Congress does not depend on
recitals of the power which it undertakes to exercise.”35

Judge

Vinson also suggested – I am not making this up – that whenever
Congress does something it hasn’t done before, its action is

32

The frivolousness of these arguments is further documented in Jack M.
Balkin’s contributions to A Healthy Debate: The Constitutionality of an
Individual Mandate, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. PENNumbra 93 (2009), available at
http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/HealthyDebate.pdf.
33
Cuccinelli, 728 F.Supp.2d at 784-86; Fla. v. Dep’t of Health and Human
Svcs., 716 F.Supp.2d at 1130-1144.
34
This criticism of Judge Vinson’s reasoning is made in Gillian Metzger &
Trevor Morrison, Health Care Reform, the Tax Power, and the Presumption of
Constitutionality, Balkinization blog, Oct. 19, 2010, available at
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2010/10/health-care-reform-tax-power-and.html.
35
Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 144 (1948).
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presumptively unconstitutional.36

These new rules would, if

consistently applied, randomly blow up large parts of the U.S.
Code.

This is constitutional interpretation undertaken in the

spirit of a saboteur in wartime.

III. The broccoli revolution

Some of the law’s opponents understand perfectly well that
the law is permissible under presently prevailing
interpretations of the Constitution.
frivolous.

They know their claims are

They don’t like the law that makes their claims

frivolous.
What they really want is, not to invoke settled law, but to
trash it – to replace the constitutional law we now have with
something radically different.37

They propose to limit federal

powers with no regard for the purposes for which those powers
are being used.

36

Fla. v. Dep’t of Health and Human Svcs., 716 F.Supp.2d at 1164 n.21 and
2011 WL at *39.
37
This is clearest in the work of Randy Barnett, who wants to authorize the
Court to dismantle large parts of the federal government, and has proposed a
constitutional amendment abolishing the federal income tax. See Randy E.
Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution: The Presumption of Liberty (2004);
Randy E. Barnett, The Case for a Federalism Amendment, Wall St. J., Apr. 23,
2009. Another prominent opponent of the law is Richard Epstein, who thinks
that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is unconstitutional. See Richard Epstein,
Forbidden Grounds: The Case Against Employment Discrimination Laws (1995);
Richard A. Epstein, Impermissible Ratemaking in Health-Insurance Reform: Why
the Reid Bill is Unconstitutional, PointofLaw.com, Dec. 18, 2009,
http://www.pointoflaw.com/columns/archives/2009/12/impermissible-ratemakingin-he.php.
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They claim originalist credentials,38 but these are bogus.
The framers’ most important decision was to replace the weak
Articles of Confederation with a central government strong
enough to address common problems.

According to those who claim

that the law is unconstitutional, however, the problem of
preexisting conditions can’t be solved at all.

A regime in

which huge national problems can’t be solved by anyone is
precisely what the framers were trying to get rid of.
If the limitations they demand are not accepted, Rivkin and
Casey warn, Congress will have the power to do absolutely
anything it likes, and “the whole concept of the federal
government being a government of limited and enumerated powers
goes out the window.”39

Judge Vinson worried that “Congress

could require that people buy and consume broccoli at regular
intervals.”40
The Broccoli Objection, as I will call it, rests on a
simple mistake:

treating a slippery slope argument as a logical

one, when in fact it is an empirical one.
Frederick Schauer showed over 25 years ago that any
slippery slope argument depends on a prediction that doing the

38

These are particularly on display in Fla. v. Dep’t of Health and Human
Svcs., 2011 WL at *2-3, 20-27.
39
Rivkin and Casey at 99.
40
Fla. v. Dep’t of Health and Human Svcs., 2011 WL at *46. Judge Hudson
expressed a similar worry during argument, though his concern was asparagus.
Kevin Sack, Tea Party Shadows Health Care Ruling, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 2011,
at A16.
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right thing in the instant case will in fact increase the
likelihood of doing the wrong thing in the danger case.41

If

there is in fact no danger, then the fact that there logically
could be has no weight.

For instance, the federal taxing power

theoretically empowers the government to tax incomes at 100%,
thereby wrecking the economy.

But there’s no slippery slope,

because there is no incentive to do this, so it won’t happen.
Similarly with the Broccoli Objection.
one real problem:

The fear rests on

there are lots of private producers,

including many in agriculture, who want to use the coercive
power of the federal government to transfer funds from your
pockets into theirs.

But the last thing they want to do is

impose duties on individuals, because then the individuals will
know that they’ve been burdened.

There are too many other ways

to get special favors in a less visible way.
So Congress is never going to force you to eat your
broccoli.

On the other hand, you’re probably already consuming

more high-fructose corn syrup than is good for you.

Subsidies

for the production of corn have produced huge surpluses of the
syrup, which in turn becomes a very cheap ingredient of massproduced food, and turns up in a remarkable amount of what you
eat.

So consumers have to face obesity, diabetes, and dental

caries – but no mandate!
41

You and I are paying for this

Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 361 (1985).
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travesty, but in such a low-visibility way that many of us never
realize that Dracula has been paying regular visits.

The

Broccoli Objection distracts attention from the real problem.
And the judiciary hasn’t got the tools to deal with that
problem.

If the Supreme Court is going to invent new limits on

the legislature, it should do so in a way that has a real chance
of preventing actual abuses.

Otherwise it is hamstringing the

legislature for no good reason.

IV.

The real constitutional limits

My Northwestern Law colleague Steven Lubet has offered an
elegant summary of the constitutional claim against the federal
health insurance mandate:

“The scholarly argument against the

mandate pretty much runs this way:

(1) There must be some limit

on federal power; (2) I can’t think of another one; and
therefore, (3) the limit must preclude the individual mandate.”42

42

Email from Prof. Steven Lubet, Dec. 14, 2010. For a prominent argument
that comes close to saying exactly this, see Jason Mazzone, Can Congress
Force You to be Healthy?, N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 2010. It’s actually very easy
to think of other ones. There’s the one rejected in McCulloch: Congress can
only choose means that are absolutely necessary to the permitted end. Or
here are a few others: Congress cannot enact any legislation that requires
the use of instrumentalities that begin with the letter J. Congress cannot
enact any legislation that calls for enforcement on Tuesdays. Congress
cannot choose any means that weighs more than 346 pounds. All of these would
drive back the specter of unlimited Congressional power. The only problem
with them is that they are silly and have nothing to do with the underlying
reasons for wanting to have limited but effective federal power in the first
place. The activity/inactivity distinction has the same problem.
More sensible limits, if one must devise some, are discussed in the
text immediately following.
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It’s not at all clear that it’s important to have
judicially imposed limits on Congressional power.

There were

practically no such limits between the 1930s and the 1990s, yet
the federal government did not take over all state functions:
tort law, contract law, criminal law, and education remained
dominated by state law.43

Lopez imposed a new restriction,

though its contours remain uncertain.

If you think a line has

to be drawn, however, you should focus on the one that the
framers of the Constitution actually drew – a line that has
nothing to do with the activity/inactivity distinction.
At Philadelphia in 1787, the Convention resolved that
Congress could “legislate in all cases to which the separate
States are incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United
States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual
Legislation.”44

This was then translated by the Committee of

Detail into the present enumeration of powers in Article I,
which was accepted as a functional equivalent by the Convention
without much discussion.45

It includes the commerce and

“necessary and proper” provisions.

43

Andrew Koppelman, How ‘Decentralization’ Rationalizes Oligarchy: John
McGinnis and the Rehnquist Court, 20 Const. Comm. 11, 20 (2003).
44
Quoted in Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the
Making of the Constitution 177 (1996).
45
“Though it has been argued that this action marked a crucial, even
subversive shift in the deliberations, the fact that it went unchallenged
suggests that the committee was only complying with the general expectations
of the Convention.” Id. at 178.
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Did the Committee of Detail botch its job, limiting
Congressional power more than the Convention intended, and
creating a regime in which Congress could not legislate in cases
the separate states were incompetent to address?
Convention not notice the massive change?

No.

Did the

This language

was accepted without objection for good reasons.

In an

important recent study, Jack Balkin shows that the word
“commerce” at the time of the framing referred to all
interaction between people, and so “the commerce power
authorizes Congress to regulate problems or activities that
produce spillover effects between states or generate collective
action problems that concern more than one state.”46

If health

care markets involve such effects or problems, then the mandate
presents, once more, a very easy case.
unlimited power:

This is not a recipe for

grandstanding statutes that horn in on matters

that are purely local, such as the federal ban on possession of
handguns near schools that the Supreme Court struck down in
Lopez, exceeds the commerce power.

But the national health care

insurance market is not a purely local matter.
One thing that the framers did not anticipate was the
spectacular advances of the past 200 years in our capacity to

46

Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 6 (2010). Once upon a time,
more sober Republicans advocated a similar understanding of the commerce
power. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, “A Government of Limited and
Enumerated Powers”: In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 Mich. L. Rev.
752 (1995).
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treat disease, prolong life, and ameliorate congenital illness.
Many of these innovations are expensive.

So with modern

medicine comes a new kind of moral horror:

the patient with a

treatable disease who cannot afford to pay for the treatment.
The reform of the American health care system to ensure
that no one would be uninsurable or bankrupted by illness was
too big a task for the states to address individually.

Any

state that mandates insurance for pre-existing conditions will
attract sick people and drive away healthy ones.
only Massachusetts has managed to do it.

That is why

(Seven other states

tried to protect people with pre-existing conditions without
mandating coverage for everyone.

The results ranged from huge

premium increases to the complete collapse of the market.47)

The

collective action problems mean that most states cannot reform
health insurance even if they all would prefer to.

It is a

matter in which the states were separately incompetent.

It is

precisely the kind of problem that the framers intended the
Federal government to be able to address.

V.

Radical libertarianism

47

See Brief Amici Curiae of March of Dimes Foundation et al, Virginia ex rel.
Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, at 4-8, available at
http://www.nsclc.org/areas/federal-rights/amicus-brief-in-support-of-healthreform-1/at_download/attachment.
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If the bill’s critics are right, we have an obligation to
replace the well-functioning constitutional system we have
inherited with one that is radically defective.

It is

mysterious why any sane person would want to do that.
was right.

Marshall

A construction which denied Congress the power to

choose the most sensible method for carrying out its lawful
purposes would be “so pernicious in its operation that we shall
be compelled to discard it.”48
What really drives the constitutional claims against the
bill is not arguments about the Commerce Clause or the taxing
power, but an implicit libertarianism that focuses on the burden
a law imposes on individuals and pays no attention at all to
legitimate state interests.49

A Heritage Foundation paper warns:

“Mandating that all private citizens enter into a contract with
a private company to purchase a good or service, or be punished
by a fine labeled a ‘tax,’ is unprecedented in American
history.”50

(Never mind that this would also invalidate George

W. Bush’s proposed privatization of Social Security, which many
Republicans continue to enthusiastically support.)

The Florida

Attorney General frankly argued for a substantive constitutional
48

McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 416.
The limits of libertarianism are further explored in Andrew Koppelman with
Tobias Barrington Wolff, A Right to Discriminate? How the Case of Boy Scouts
of America v. James Dale Warped the Law of Free Association (2009).
50
Randy Barnett, Nathaniel Stewart, and Todd Gaziano, Why the Personal
Mandate to Buy Health Insurance is Unprecedented and Unconstitutional,
Heritage Foundation Legal Memorandum, Dec. 9, 2009, available at
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/12/why-the-personal-mandate-tobuy-health-insurance-is-unprecedented-and-unconstitutional.
49
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right “to make personal healthcare decisions without
governmental interference.”51

Near the end of his opinion,

almost as an afterthought, Judge Hudson writes: “At its core,
this dispute is not simply about regulating the business of
insurance – or crafting a system of universal health insurance
coverage – it’s about an individual’s right to choose to
participate.”52
The Supreme Court rejected the purported “inherent right of
every freeman to care for his own body and health in such way as
to him seems best” in 1905, in Jacobson v. Massachusetts.53

The

claimant there asserted that mandatory smallpox vaccination
violated his rights.

It is true that vaccination is an

imposition on one’s liberty.

Dying of smallpox is also an

imposition on one’s liberty.
Jacobson was decided the same year as the infamous Lochner
v. New York,54 in which the Court invented a right of employers
to be free from maximum hours laws.

The right that Republicans

are now asserting was too much even for the Lochner Court.
Jacobson wrong?

Was

Does the Constitution protect the smallpox

virus?

51

Fla. v. Dep’t of Health and Human Svcs., 716 F.Supp.2d at 1162, quoting
plaintiff’s argument.
52
Cuccinelli, 728 F.Supp.2d at 788.
53
197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905).
54
198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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This implicit libertarianism is pervasive in the arguments
against the law, but it is intellectually incoherent, because it
is intended to apply only against the federal government, not
the states.55

It has not been explained where this individual

right is supposed to come from – it happens not to be mentioned
in the text of the Constitution – or why it doesn’t also
invalidate anything that the states try to do to force people
into insurance pools.

Conclusion

What will the Supreme Court do?
say this:

There is no nice way to

the silliness of the constitutional objections may

not be enough to stop these judges from relying on them to
strike down the law.

The Republican party, increasingly, is the

party of urban legends:

that tax cuts for the rich always pay

for themselves, that government spending doesn’t create jobs,
that government overregulation of banks caused the crash of
2008, that global warming is not happening.

The

unconstitutionality of health care reform is another of those
legends, legitimated in American culture by frequent repetition.

55

The Supreme Court recently made clear that if there were a rights-based
objection to a federal statute, that would imply that a state would likewise
be prohibited from enacting that statute. Comstock, 130 S.Ct. at 1956.
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If the Constitution were as defective as the bill’s
opponents claim it is, a regime in which national problems must
remain permanently unsolved, why would it deserve our
allegiance?

The only sane thing to do would be to try to get

free of it – to try, by amendment or judicial construction, to
nullify its limits so that we can live in a humanly habitable
world.

To continue to live with such a perverse constitution

would be mindless ancestor worship.
But the opponents of reform have been unfair to the
framers.

Chief Justice Marshall was right when he said that the

Constitution does not “attempt to provide, by immutable rules,
for exigencies which, if foreseen at all, must have been seen
dimly, and which can be best provided for as they occur.”56
Instead, it provides a structure for us to govern ourselves.
That is precisely what Congress did when, at long last, it took
on the spectacularly broken American system of health care
delivery.

56

McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 415.
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